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THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION
By
Zachary Burley*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Idea of Arbitration is authored by Jan Paulsson, the Michael Klein
Distinguished Scholar Chair at the University of Miami School of Law.1 Paulsson is an
internationally recognized figure in the field of international arbitration. He is a former
President of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration, immediate past
President of the LCIA, a former Vice-President of the International Court of Arbitration
of the International Chamber of Commerce, a member of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in The Hague, a board member of the American Arbitration Association, and
a member of the Singapore International Arbitration Court.2 He is President of the
Administrative Tribunal of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a
Judge of the IMF Administrative Tribunal, and past President of the World Bank
Administrative Tribunal.3 Paulsson is also a founding partner of Three Crowns LLP, a
boutique international arbitration firm located in Washington DC, London, and Paris.4
Paulsson wrote this book to offer a theoretical foundation for understanding how
arbitration functions in society.5 He poses fundamental questions such as, “what makes us
confide in an arbitrator?” and “when arbitrators have been chosen, may their conduct or
decisions be questioned?”.6 It was Paulsson’s theoretical goal to examine whether the
arbitral process, which has proven itself to be a “valuable social institution,” will
continue to be valuable and adaptive to the many challenges it faces today.7 The
methodological premise of this book is to present the materials of the book in a way that
even readers with little to no arbitration knowledge will be stimulated and able to discuss
the propositions within the book.
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This book is an excellent tool for law students, legal professors, and practitioners
alike. It examines fundamental ideas relevant to arbitration that challenge any reader to
think more profoundly and come to a better understanding of those ideas.
II.   OVERVIEW
The Idea of Arbitration is comprised of nine chapters which can be grouped into
three parts: the past, present, and future of arbitration. Part One, which includes Chapter
One, speculates about the past and why we as a society choose to arbitrate. Part Two
consists of seven chapters that attempt to look carefully at the present state of arbitration.
Within Part Two, the chapters discuss topics such as the legal foundations of arbitration
(Chapter Two), public policy limitations (Chapter Four), and even the inadequacies of
arbitration (Chapter Five), just to name a few. Part Three, the final chapter, focuses on
the future of arbitration.
III.  

PART ONE: CHAPTER ONE: THE IMPULSE TO ARBITRATE

“The idea of arbitration is that of binding resolution of disputes accepted with
serenity by those who bear its consequences because of their special trust in chosen
decision-makers.”8 This is Paulsson’s thesis laid out in the first sentence of his book.
What kind of entity can achieve this level of acceptance? Surely not courts, Paulsson
suggests.9 Courts cannot achieve this goal because courts are forced to struggle with
philosophical ideas of a “social contract” that often lacks any mooring to reality.10
Arbitration, on the other hand, can achieve that goal because arbitration is freedom
reconciled with law.11 Acceptance of arbitration is a distinguishing feature of free
societies.12 Paulsson hypothesizes this because most people find it demeaning to be told
what to do and fear abuse from those in power.13
However, there is a paradox because people want freedom, yet they also want
law.14 Generally, people are willing to give up some of their freedom for a bargain, such
as avowing oneself to criminal laws so to obtain protection by those same laws.15 This
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bargain also applies to reckless behavior in the hopes that society as a whole will behave
more prudently and to contracts in that we accept a bad bargain because, on the whole,
we want contracts to be final and binding.16 We accept the “rule of law,” yet there is a lot
of hesitation to do so because each of us individuals have varying degrees of perceptions
and interactions with the law.17 As Paulsson so eloquently puts it, “[w]e want the rule of
law, not rule by law.”18 Beyond the rule of law, individuals want their own law.19 The
idea of arbitration stems from this notion.20
In this first chapter, Paulsson explores the history of the idea of arbitration and
poses an important question of whether any common organizing principles remain to be
kept for use in today’s society.21
The first historical principle explored is the arbitrator as archetype.22 Paulsson
discusses the psychologist Carl Jung’s concept of psychological archetypes.23 In Jung's
psychological context, archetypes are innate, universal prototypes for ideas and may be
used to interpret observations.24 When someone thinks of an ideal arbitrator it is
suggested that maybe he or she thinks of an idealized form of himself or herself.25
Next, Paulsson examines the attributes of the arbitrator as archetype:
commitment, capability, concern, attentiveness to consequences, and condignity.26
Commitment is summed up as the parties desire for an arbitrator who is
personally and deeply engaged in the task at hand, which is resolving a dispute and
preventing infectious conflict.27 An arbitrator’s capability is based on his or her
understanding of the debate.28 Capability leads to the essential authority of the archetype
16
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and gains the respect of arbitrants.29 Paulsson discusses concern for the arbitrants as an
vital attribute much like the skills and attitudes of good parents.30 He says that the
archetype does not “anesthetize his heart,” but has personal and benign interest in the
parties.31
Of all the attributes, attentiveness to consequences presents an interesting
difficulty for an arbitrator because there is a tension between deciding every case as
though it were the arbitrator’s last and thinking about arbitrating future disputes.32 How
an arbitrator is perceived affects the ideal of an arbitrator’s individualized approach to
every dispute.33
Lastly, condignity means that the arbitrator issues awards or punishments that are
merited or warranted, and are not the product of the arbitrators disposition, favor, or
generosity, but of a just awareness of the appropriate consequences of the parties’
conduct.34 All of these attributes show that the idea of arbitration is above all a
transformation from some features of the imagined “judicial temperament,” such as an
impersonal attitude and an indifference to the parties.35
Following the discussion of the archetype arbitrator’s attributes, Paulsson
discusses the uncertain historical parallels stating that it is usual for advocates of any
institution to invoke historical pedigree in an attempt to demonstrate that their institution
echoes the wisdom of the ages.36 Through his example of ancient Islamic law traditions
of arbitration, Paulsson questions such historic parallels and states, “there is, in sum,
nothing eternal or inevitable about arbitration; it must find its meaning and its acceptance
in the modern world it purports to serve. It cannot be static.”37
Next, Chapter One focuses on ambivalence towards law.38 The idea of arbitration
looks to a decision viewed by the parties and their peers as in agreement with legitimate
expectations, with no thirst for legal convention or modification beyond that of a fair
hearing.39 Paulsson posits that arbitration is a quest for civilized closure.40
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To bring Chapter One to a close there is discussion of messy realities and the
quest for a more noble court system.41 Paulsson explains that the presumption in a free
society should be that citizens may develop ways to resolve their disputes by means they
find attractive and particularly suited to their activity and character, even if those
approaches bear little similarity to procedures which a legislature might develop for
general use.42 Arbitration will better succeed and the best results will be achieved in
societies where judges and arbitrators (courts and arbitration) see themselves as engaged
in a collaborative undertaking in the interest of justice because common sense tells us that
a place where the courts perform poorly is not likely to be good for arbitration, nor is a
place where arbitration is dominated by never-ending judicial corrections one where the
courts are to be admired.43
Chapter One is vital to the understanding of The Idea of Arbitration. As it
explores arbitration’s past it sets the important foundation for every chapter that follows.
Chapter One establishes the roots of society’s current perceptions and views about
arbitration and arbitrators. It accurately sets the stage for the rest of the book in a very
user-friendly form that readers will find inviting and educational.
IV.  

PART THREE: CHAPTERS TWO THROUGH

EIGHT :

THE

PRESENT STATE OF

ARBITRATION

A.  Chapter Two: The Legal Foundation of Arbitration
Chapter Two focuses on the specifically legal foundations of arbitration, rather
than philosophical or political. 44 “The law applicable to arbitration is not the law
applicable in arbitration.”45 The law applicable in arbitration offers standards to guide
arbitrators decisions whereas the law applicable to arbitration refers to the basis of
arbitrators authority and of the status of their decision.46
This chapter begins by displaying the “great paradox of arbitration” which is that
arbitration seeks assistance of the very public authorities from which it wants to free
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itself.47 Paulsson asks several questions relating to this paradox such as what will courts
tolerate and to what will they offer their authority and supremacy?48
These questions are examined through four competing proposals. The first is
referred to as territorial thesis which holds that any arbitration is unavoidably national, it
functions according to the law of the place of arbitration.49 The second is called the
pluralistic thesis which holds that arbitration may be given influence by more than one
legal state, none of them inevitably crucial.50 The third proposal is that arbitration is the
creation of an autonomous legal order accepted as such by arbitrators and judges.51 The
fourth and final proposition is that arbitration may be effective under provisions that do
not depend on national law or judges at all.52 Paulsson concludes that the fourth
proposition ultimately merges with the pluralistic thesis and expands it: it accounts for a
feature of pluralism in the domination.53 Chapter Two focuses a majority of its pages on
the territorial thesis and the pluralistic thesis.
The territorial thesis is summed up by Paulsson as follows, “Our planet is divided
into plot, each attributed to a jealous state. What happens within that plot can have no
legal significance if it is not given that effect by those who exercise power in the name of
the state holding dominion there.”54 This thesis is outdated, but its influence lingers.55
Francis Mann is the leading advocate of the territorial thesis.56 In his essay titled ‘Lex
Facit Arbitrum’57 he focused on the law applied by arbitrators and not the legal
foundation of arbitration.58 The central principle of his essay was that arbitrators must
obey the private international law of the seat of arbitration.59
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Paulsson criticizes Mann and the territorial thesis because it is not apt in today’s
world.60 He cites examples such as how Switzerland allows parties to opt out of any
judicial review of awards involving only foreign interests and, more fundamentally, that
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards mandates enforcement of arbitral awards without the need for any manifestation
of approval of the courts of the place of arbitration.61 The territorial thesis simply does
not fit with the realities of today’s international society that is no longer constrained
within national units.62
The pluralistic thesis contends that the forces of internationalization have now
fashioned awards which do not owe their power to the law of the place of arbitration.63
Paulsson gives an example of what he refers to as a “delocalized award” where
arbitration takes place in Country A and an award is rendered there subject to court
appeal.64 Normally, other countries are prepared to enforce this foreign award only if they
are satisfied that the award is binding.65 Country A may have laws that determine if an
award is binding perhaps if that award has resisted appeal or no appeal has been final.66
Country B, however, can legislate a rule that an award, wherever rendered, is binding for
the enforcement in B at the moment it is pronounced.67
This “delocalization,” or as Paulsson calls it “plurilocalization,” refers to the
possibility that an award may be accepted by the legal order of an enforcement
jurisdiction whether or not the legal order of its country of origin has also embraced it.68
National legal orders assert supremacy in their national space, and they may decree that
the same facts command different results.69
Chapter Two’s focus on the legal foundation for arbitration, namely the territorial
and pluralistic approaches, is concise and straightforwardly explained through the use of
simple examples that help flesh out these propositions. After reading this chapter, readers
will have a much better understanding of where arbitration grew its legal roots.
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B. Chapter Three: Private Challenges
Chapter Three concentrates on what happens when private parties challenge the
arbitral process.70 The chapter opens with discussion of front-end and back-end challenges
to arbitration through court intervention and how if this is allowed arbitration
loses its appeal.71 Protests to arbitration can arise at the outset, when respondents protest
their alleged obligation to submit to the process, during the process, when either party
may complain about how arbitration is being conducted, or after the arbitration, when one
of the parties may ask a court to set aside the arbitral award.72
A significant amount of Chapter Three focuses on the front-end protest.73 There
are four common initial challenges to arbitration: (i) the party never consented to give the
supposed arbitrator any authority of any kind; or that although it did agree to arbitration:
(ii) the law prohibits arbitration of the exact claim raised; (iii) the claim falls outside the
scope of agreement to arbitrate; or (iv) the claim should be dismissed without substantive
examination because liability is in any event barred by some legal or contractual
impediment.74
The first of these objections is a jurisdictional challenge that Paulsson discusses at
some length.75 When is a controversy about the arbitrator’s authority to be decided and
by whom?76 Paulsson suggests that the words “I challenge the tribunal’s authority” must
not be an “abracadabra” that allows arbitration disappear lest arbitration lose its allure.77
Paulsson posits that arbitrators must have the authority to decide whether or not
they have jurisdiction to hear a particular case.78 This is known as kompetenzkompetenz.79 Without this fundamental principle, the weakest challenge would stop the
arbitration, and parties to entirely legitimate arbitration agreements would be thrust into
the courts when that is exactly against their bargain in the first place.80 Paulsson uses a
70
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very simple, logical example to further explain why arbitrators must have this authority to
decide jurisdiction: without it, he states, the party which rightfully invokes a valid
arbitration agreement might have to spend a lot of time and resources, including money, in
court, including various appeals, only to be told after the long judicial process that it
was correct from the outset, has now been exposed to courts when the avoidance of
courts was the very reason for their arbitration agreement, and must now start from the
beginning with a stale case or an impoverished opponent.81 This example illustrates why
kompetenz-kompetenz, “jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction,” is such a fundamental feature
of modern arbitration.82
The French take what they term competence-competence a step further by not
only empowering the arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction, but also by prohibiting
the courts in the meantime from determining disputes feasibly covered by arbitration
agreements.83
American courts have really grappled and struggled with the idea of
arbitrability.84 Paulsson goes as far as to propose courts struggle with the use of the word
arbitrability.85 He lobbies for a more limited definition of the word so as to not include all
kinds of threshold issues.86 “If the definition of flying is broadened to include jumping,
kangaroos will be birds. Greater mental discipline is needed.”87 Landmark cases such as
First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan,88Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,89and Green Tree
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Financial Corp. v. Bazzle90are discussed at length to further develop the concept of
arbitrability.91
A fundamental concept that is present when discussing authority to rule on
jurisdiction is the idea of separability.92 Separability is of great importance to the
effectiveness of the arbitration process and can be summarized by the example of a
respondent arguing that a contract as a whole is invalid; that this is automatically fatal to
its arbitration clause as well; and that as a consequence there can be no arbitration under
that clause.93 Arbitration would lose its function if courts accepted this logic.94 Paulsson
continues with a fascinating, in-depth analysis of separability with various examples and
illustrations.95
Chapter Three ends with considerations about why an arbitral tribunal’s decision
about the admissibility of a claim does not concern the tribunal’s jurisdiction and is
therefore final, and, finally, a discussion about post-award challenges.96
This chapter is Paulsson’s greatest triumph in The Idea of Arbitration. It is
essential that law students studying arbitration read it because it discusses fundamental
issues with great clarity. His section on separability alone lends great insight into a
challenging topic. This chapter lays out important issues that law students and practioners
will be confronted with in the world of arbitration on a regular basis.
C. Chapter Four: The Public Challenge
This chapter introduces the reader to the public policy limitations on arbitration.97
To what degree will arbitration be accepted by the State, in light of the fact that
arbitration offers an obvious alternative to state-administered courts?98
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In free societies, what is not explicitly prohibited is allowed.99 Or at least that is
the presumption.100 Public officials must take the accountability for making their intent
clear.101 Too many mandatory orders create public alienation and wear away the rule of
law.102 However, arbitrators do not, unless they are ready to sacrifice the enforcement of
their awards by State courts, have the authority to disregard the law.103
Chapter Four begins with a discussion of the tension between public regulation
and arbitration.104 Some public officials are troubled by arbitration as a potential tool for
regulatory disobedience.105 One extreme view holds that arbitration shouldn’t exist at all
because the rule of law is the most fundamental public policy while Paulsson notes that
the fact that an activity is regulated does not make it off-limits to arbitration.106 However,
some people believe that arbitration should be tolerated only with caution.107
The next section of Chapter Four addresses the question “why should arbitration
be allowed at all?”108 Free societies allow citizens to arrange their affairs as they see fit
including the freedom to opt for arbitration instead of court systems.109 However, the law
limits this freedom of contract, and disagreements often involve claims that those limits
have been disobeyed.110 Arbitrators face a tension because they attempt to resolve
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disputes without offending the rule of law while also respecting contract freedom.111
Several public policy limitations are explored, such as how arbitration cannot
protect conspiracies intended to avoid antitrust laws or the regulation of financial
institutions and adhesionary arbitration agreements imposed on weaker parties of
consumers should not be upheld.112
Most national laws declare agreements to arbitrate unenforceable with respect to
certain matters.113 Status determinations, family relations, bankruptcy, intellectual
property, and antitrust are a few of the areas that are off-limits, and while they may seem
arbitrary there is a common thread of a state’s interest in these matters.114 For example, it
doesn’t make sense to allow private arbitrators to make marital, retired, or disabled status
determinations because those categories create entitlements against the state.115 Paulsson
thinks that the reason for declaring some types of disputes as off-limits has more to do
with “whether arbitration may significantly affect private or public interests which are
manifestly unrepresented in an adequate way by the parties or the arbitrator” than the
acumen level of the arbitrators.116
The remaining sections of this chapter examine whether parties may agree to be
bound by arbitral determinations as to the effect of the law, whether it purports to
complement or to alter their agreements and whether the rule in question is derived from
ordinary law or from something more fundamental, said to be part of public policy.117
To end this chapter on public challenges, Paulsson summarizes the degrees of
arbitral authority beginning with the types of legally important decisions arbitrators have
clear and final authority to make and moving through decisions that public intervention is
more and more likely.118
Chapter Four discusses many fundamental ideas that anyone in the field of
arbitration needs to understand. Paulsson’s analysis of arbitral authority in light of public
policy considerations is expansive. The conclusion of this chapter with a concise
summation of the degrees of arbitral authority ties this chapter together nicely.
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D. Chapter Five: Ethical Challenges
The shortcomings of arbitration are the focus of Chapter Five.119 Arbitrations
Achilles’ heel, from Paulsson’s perspective, is the lack of accountability of arbitrators.120
Because arbitral awards are not generally subject to appeal, there is no accountability to
tiered superiors, nor are arbitrators necessarily subject to discipline of a regulated
profession.121 In Paulsson’s eyes, confidence in the ethical standards of arbitrators and
arbitral organizations is the “Alpha and the Omega” of the legitimacy of the process.122
Sundaresh Menon, the then Attorney General of Singapore and soon to be Chief
Justice of Singapore, delivered a keynote speech in May 2012 at a session of a Congress
of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration addressing ethical issues facing
arbitration today.123 He questioned the sustainability of the success of arbitration unless
the risks that stem from arbitral ambition are better controlled.124 Menon explains that
there are growing numbers of arbitrators who are “in essence business people in search of
opportunities,” creating a tension between the self-promoting and self-dealing of the
arbitrators and their public duty to uphold justice.125 He also addressed how arbitrators are
invariably profit-driven and biased, or that they always act strategically so they can be
repeat arbitrators.126
This keynote address, more or less, sums up Chapter Five. How these ethical
issues are addressed within the industry are also explored.127 Paulsson thinks that selfregulation alone is not enough, that the stakes are too high in arbitration to simply allow
self-appraisal, peer pressure, or other forms of self-regulation to be the only line of
defense.128 Arbitral institutions are better suited to meet these ethical challenges, but it is
unclear if they have acceptable structures to do so.129 If they do not rise to meet these
119
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challenges it is only a matter of time before political actors will step in and regulate
strictly on a process they do not fully understand which will result in undesirable
bureaucratization and a gradual destruction of the utilities of arbitration.130
Paulsson discusses an arbitrators “fitness to serve” at some length. He divides the
criteria into two categories: integrity and aptitude.131 Integrity is absolutely paramount
because even great ability can be corrupted which would irreparably flaw the whole
process of arbitration.132 The integrity category is comprised of the traits of independence
and impartiality.133 The key issue of independence is whether the arbitrator has an interest
in the outcome.134 An arbitrator from a law firm which derives substantial revenue from
one of the parties is a prime example of not being independent.135 Impartiality involves
examining the case with an open mind.136
There are many reasons that lead to arbitrator bias such as friendship or
professional relationships or the desire to please the appointing lawyer or party to gain
future benefits such as repeat business.137
At the conclusion of Chapter Five, Paulsson makes the case for an elitist approach
to the ethical challenges of arbitration.138 He feels that, given the large stakes involved in
many arbitrations, there should be an elite corps of arbitrators.139 By elite he means that
of a “meritocracy in terms of substantive competence, procedural adroitness, and above all
absolute impartiality.”140 This elite corps needs to be several hundred “first-rate”
commercial arbitrators that is an open shop that crosses cultures, genders, and
nationalities in order to meet the needs of the international community.141
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Paulsson doesn’t understand why or how it is good for the arbitral process if as
many people as possible can be arbitrators.142 In his opinion, elitism is not a sin and the
ambition to work at the most elite level is healthy for arbitration.143 The reputation of
arbitrators grow slowly over time with proof of independence and impartiality.144
Chapter Five is a great critique of arbitration, namely arbitrators. Paulsson’s fear
of arbitrator independence and impartiality really shines through. At points, he
dramatizes the “stakes” of arbitration and makes them feel like life or death matters.
However, on the whole, this chapter is a strong example of the shortcomings of
arbitration.
E. Chapters Six Through Eight: The International Sphere of Arbitration
Chapters Six through Eight deal with problems in the international sphere where
arbitration has a unique and growing role to play in the absence of anything like a unified
global political system.145
Chapter Six discusses international challenges facing arbitration.146 When it
comes to resolving international commercial disputes, arbitration has a monopoly on the
field.147 As Paulsson so correctly puts it, “We could live without arbitration. But if
international arbitration disappears, economic exchanges would face a legal void.”148
Why is this so?
Within a national setting, a plaintiff can depend on the jurisdiction of courts,
which the defendant cannot resist.149 But there are no international civil courts of required
jurisdiction.150 The defendant must consent to appear.151 Because it is extremely unusual
for parties residing in two different nations to agree to the jurisdiction of the others
national court system or even a neutral court system (with some exceptions depending on
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the type of contract), international arbitration is the only vehicle to facilitate commercial
dealings across national borders.152
One might think that parties from different cultures and national backgrounds
could clash during international arbitration, but Paulsson refutes that position by stating
that all parties to any arbitration have the same expectations.153 Parties clearly have a lack
of appetite for disputes because they contracted away from courts.154 Their expectations
of arbitration are for justice to be served quickly, fairly, and effectively, at no cost to the
deserving party.155
Even though international arbitration is experiencing a golden age it is not without
its criticisms. Paulsson discusses what he calls the inequality of arms within the realm of
international arbitration.156 While most people present the argument that the very cost of
arbitration is a form of serious inequality when parties financial resources are at separate
ends of the spectrum, Paulsson thinks that when compared to the cost of litigation, and
due to lack of empirical studies to confirm, the cost of arbitration isn’t a true inequality of
arms.157 For him, the real inequality, which is specific to arbitration, is the supposed
disadvantages of being treated as an outsider.158
Paulsson further discusses three factors that affect the challenges of the
international environment. The first, a healthy challenge, is the evolution of new entrants
are being absorbed by modern arbitral institutions.159 Stable institutions accepting a new
diversity of individuals into their decision-making organs has influenced other, newer
institutions to do the same.160 There is a current culture of inclusiveness that is
diversifying arbitral institutions.161
The second factor that affects the international environment is the “[d]ogmatic
resistance to the arbitral process.”162 Some decision-makers are stubborn and continue to
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disrupt efforts to become more successful and integrated participants in international
arbitration and this attitude can be costly.163
The last factor is that modern international dealings are no longer the exclusive
domain of professionals, whether in the public of private sectors, but also involve greater
numbers of ordinary people like consumers, workers, and citizens.164 This presents
significant problems of unequal bargaining power and a lack of understanding between
ordinary consumers, workers, and citizens and the usual predominant parties of
commercial international arbitration such a businesses, investors, and public
authorities.165
Chapter Seven focuses on national public policy in the international
environment.166 The international environment adds layers of complexity to questions
concerning whether the law displaces the contract.167 Not only is choice of law more
complex, but the actions of judges and arbitrators are more intricate.168 For example, a
judge might apply his or her own country’s law and choose not to defer to arbitration
conducted in a different country, even if the arbitrators are acting in accordance with the
law of that other country and with the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.169 Sometimes these
concepts are very abstract and hard to envision, but Paulsson gives an example of
recurring problems and complexity in the international context of a country that prohibits
professional boxing and the sale of alcoholic beverages.170 This example is a brilliant
discussion of just how involved arbitration can be in the international realm.
Paulsson goes on to discuss how this complexity is “precisely the kind of thing
that explains the need for international arbitration.”171 Because public policy is invoked
in the face of an agreement signed by the parties, the issue arises whether or not a
decision-maker should allow one of the parties escape that contract.172 If neutral
arbitrators are not allowed to decide whether a contract is to be altered or voided because
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of the alleged public policy of a home state of one of the parties the parties would get
exactly what they did not bargain for, the courts.173
The chapter then turns to what Paulsson refers to as “clumsy nomenclature” and a
discussion of frequently cited phrases referencing public policy that tend to confuse rather
than shed any light on the subject of international arbitration.174 His discussion of
“domestic”175 (or “internal”) vs. “national international”176 vs. “truly international”177
public policy helps make these confusing terms less obscure.178
Chapter Seven ends with various discussions of the potential effects of public
policy as it generally arises in practice: before a judge who is requested by a disputant to
hear the case and disregard the arbitrator; before a judge asked to set aside or refuse to
enforce an arbitral award; and before the arbitrator who has a responsibility to
contemplate the usefulness of the arbitral award and therefore to “glance both sideways
and forward to the courts.”179
Chapter Eight takes a theoretical approach in analyzing the seldom considered
issue of arbitral authority to reject unlawful laws.180 Paulsson refers to this chapter as
possibly the least “necessary chapter in the book, but that it could appeal to the more
thoughtful reader.”181 Legal philosophy is discussed at length throughout the chapter in
an attempt to lay a foundation for Paulsson’s thought-provoking propositions at the
conclusion of this chapter.182 Paulsson leaves the reader with ten “short” propositions
based on the ideas presented in Chapter Eight.183
Chapters Six through Eight probe the reader to think in ways he or she might not
have up to this point in the book. Paulsson’s discussion and analysis of international
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challenges to arbitration, national public policy in the international context, and arbitral
authority is stimulating and forces the reader to delve more deeply into why international
arbitration is all the more important to international actors. His analysis of key arbitration
cases, as well as his ability to simplify the unclear is truly on display in these chapters
focusing on international arbitration.
V. PART THREE : CHAPTER NINE : IMAGES IN A CRYSTAL BALL
Chapter Nine glances at the future of arbitration.184 It begins by discussing the
fundamental inquiry of whether arbitration may be viewed as a completely self-sufficient
system needing no aid from the state, only tolerance.185 The idea of arbitration is one of
liberty because arbitration allows private parties to take their freedom of contract to the
ultimate, final level to self-regulating said contract.186 No matter where parties come
from, they tend to be dissatisfied by court systems that are costly and waste valuable
time.187 Court systems, no matter where in the world, are stock full of critics that use
examples of outright inequality, of genuine expectations being violated, and of hypocrisy
to degrade these pillars of justice where any result less than perfect is unacceptable.188
Clearly, arbitration seems like the logical counter to court systems because of cost
savings, expertise, and efficiency, however those grand dreams often dissipate when
claims actually arise and one party recoils.189 The tension between the two systems,
courts and arbitration, remain even though some may look for arbitration to become a
champion over law.190 However, Paulsson feels it would be a mistake to yield to the
attraction of viewing arbitration as the victory for party autonomy over law because
without paying regard to the law, decisions would not be final and courts would
invalidate awards, making arbitration worthless.191
It is only through cooperation between courts and arbitration that parties can
achieve their ultimate bargain.192 Arbitration must compliment rather than test court
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systems.193 Paulsson examines this proposition under the lenses of the relationship
between judges and arbitrators, the shared objectives of courts and arbitration (i.e.,
justice), and how complimenting each other is the best way to achieve that objective.194
As Paulsson puts it, “a legal system is unlikely to function very long with ‘good
arbitration’ and ‘bad courts’.”195
Perhaps the most controversial suggestion by Paulsson is also discussed in this
final chapter: unilateral appointment of arbitrators.196 The ideal beginning of arbitration is
the empanelling of a tribunal which is jointly agreed by the parties for reasons of fairness
and justice.197 He proposes a default rule to be applied whenever the parties have neither
jointly nominated the entire tribunal nor expressly stipulated that there are to be unilateral
appointments, should be that all arbitrators are appointed by the neutral appointing
authority.198 This has gained Paulsson many critics from arbitration academics to
practioners.199 Paulsson ultimately thinks a party will insist upon the right to seek to
appoint one’s own arbitrator because they hope that the arbitrator will share their
viewpoint and values and not the overall picture and values of both parties.200
The Idea of Arbitration ends much as it began, with a story of freedom and the
necessary analytical approach to understanding the limits placed upon it, ideas that are to
be respected and explored, and balances that must be struck in order for arbitration to
remain a valuable legal tool in our ever changing society.201
Chapter Nine accomplishes its goal and then some. Paulsson looks to the future of
arbitration and really rounds out many of the ideas he establishes in prior chapters. For
example, his unique idea for unilateral appointment of arbitrators stirs much debate and
engages the reader with ideas discussed early in the book. While his proposed default rule
has pure intentions, this idea seems contradictory to the fundamental view of freedom of
contract. Isn’t the parties bargain sacred? Unilateral appointment of arbitrators is
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something parties bargain for and should not be thrown away so easily. After all, there is
no guarantee that institutionally-appointed arbitrators will lack the bias for which
Paulsson is so adamantly opposed.
VI.  

CONCLUSION

The Idea of Arbitration offers a theoretical foundation for understanding how
arbitration functions in the world today. It thoroughly examines the past, present, and
future of arbitration by analyzing key, fundamental principles of arbitration. Paulsson is
masterful at challenging the reader to think more deeply and possibly differently about
well-known arbitral concepts. Through his use of questioning the reader is forced to
confront ideas, and while Paulsson gives some background and guidance, it is ultimately
the reader who arrives at their own answers.
Despite the book’s length (301 pages), it feels less overwhelming because the
organization was well thought out and planned. The structure of viewing arbitration in its
past, preset, and future makes this book even more readable. Concepts and ideas build
throughout the book and a concept that is discussed in the last chapter, i.e., freedom of
contract, is understood more fully because the reader has knowledge of its foundational
importance to arbitration and how courts, legalists, and practitioners have and do view it.
If there is a slight critique to The Idea of Arbitration it is that sometimes Paulsson
swings a little far into the theoretical aspects of arbitration without a proper foundation to
escort the reader. However brief a reader might feel “lost,” Paulsson generally quickly
swings back to center and captures the readers thoughts and attention.
This book is an absolute must read for anyone and everyone in the law
community. Arbitration is so prevalent in our society that every lawyer should have a
working knowledge of it. To the law student with little to no knowledge of arbitration,
this book will present all the fundamental concepts necessary to have a “working
knowledge” of the subject (some cases are even analyzed and can act as a great
supplement for an arbitration class in law school). To the seasoned lawyer that knows
arbitration inside and out, this book will make you think about arbitration in ways you
never have before.
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